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Abstract
Simulated crisis scenarios are frequently cited as effective tools for organisational and
individual learning. The issue is raised that simulation exercises may concentrate
learning outcomes for exercise designers, facilitators and observers (the consultants).
In contrast, learning outcomes for players (the clients) may be more difficult to define
or measure.  The authors wish to challenge the notion of organisational learning as a
package to be delivered fait accompli, and offer a rival argument that the role of
consultants is to empower organisations to learn for themselves and continue after the
consultants have left.  The paper reviews contemporary theories of learning and
considers the commercial and ethical questions about the relationship between
consultants and the teams targeted for training.
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A Challenge for Designers, Facilitators and Evaluators
Exercises and simulations pose specific challenges to trainers and educators in their
role as designers, facilitators or evaluators.  This paper argues that the very nature of
crisis itself may question existing theoretical perspectives on learning and the conduct
of simulations. The paper is based on collaborative research carried out by the authors
over the past five years based on a major international bank in the UK.
Simulation exercises provide the only experiential means by which to train people in
an environment that is as realistic as possible for an as yet unknown crisis. In this
sense, at least, crisis simulations are somewhat unique in that effectiveness cannot be
gauged against other modes of training.  For example, flight simulators can be
contrasted for effectiveness against flying lessons in real aircraft.  Rolfe (1992) has
referred to this as ‘positive or negative transfer of training’.  Similarly, educational
simulations can be measured against traditional blackboard and chalk methodologies.
For those wishing to evaluate crisis simulations, it is unlikely that the teams trained
will ever be used in the same format to manage a real crisis. Crisis scenarios are for
any management structure, unique events that do not fit with an organisation’s
history, policy or procedures, if they did then they would not be a crisis.  The paper
will review existing knowledge about learning as applied to simulation environments
and consider how crisis simulations can most effectively add value to the learning
process.4
What is a Crisis
Crisis, as a phenomenon may be viewed as amorphous.  It can effect individuals,
groups and organisations even nations in almost limitless contexts. The term crisis
needs to be understood if it is to be effectively treated in a training environment.
There is rich literature developing on the theme of crisis, but little consensus as to
how the term should be defined or modelled. Often the terms emergency, disaster,
catastrophe, civil emergency might be used to mean the same thing (Borodzicz, 1997,
Dombrowsky, 1995).
In the authors’ own research, it was found to be helpful to narrow the view of crisis
down to the training requirements of a particular organisation.  Typically, the focus
would be a particular organisation or system in crisis, requiring a group of
individuals, perhaps specialists or experts, but often line managers and subordinates,
to come together and manage a critical situation.  A useful analogy here might be the
Chinese concept of crisis, viewed as a ‘turning point’, containing an element of both
‘danger’ and ‘opportunity’.  Solutions to the crisis are by definition unorthodox, at
least for the operational and cultural history of the organisation.
It is important for scenario planning to understand ‘crisis’ as distinct from
‘emergencies’ and ‘disasters’. Emergencies are situations requiring rapid applications
of the organisation’s existent policies and procedures.  Simulated emergencies are,
therefore, tests or drills, used to practice or evaluate the behaviour of key personnel in
their performance.  In this context both the problem and solutions are not problematic.
Simulations are of value here in providing experiential learning for the players.
In contrast, simulations of crisis are modelled by disaster analysts on events that are
‘ill-structured’ (Turner and Pidgeon, 1997), and complex ( Perrow, 1984), requiring
facilitators and players to interactively create a solution as part of the game scenario.
This adds a second challenge to game designers who as part of the facilitating
experience are required to engage in a learning process themselves.  In fact it is one of
the findings from the research conducted by the authors that learning for facilitators
and designers is often a more intense experience than the one received by the players.
Players need to learn how to work together and respond to the crisis. Facilitators, in5
contrast, would need to not only construct the crisis for players, but also ensure the
players find a solution.
Sundelius (1998: 118), for example, argues that crisis is an opportunity for reform,
innovation, exercising leadership, organisational and individual learning through the
crisis experience. Hence, crises become turning points that may also induce arousal,
for instance because of the potential for achievement (Fink, 1986: 133). Stern (1997:
69) argues that experience of crises could ‘contribute to a posture of cognitive
openness conducive to individual and collective learning’, although, specific
perceptions of crises could also impede and may form obstacles for learning.
Moreover, when the problems are unfamiliar and operating procedures unsuitable, i.e.
during crises, ‘then the need for flexible and creative thinking constitutes an
additional source of stress and mental demand’ (Flin, 1996: 105). Nevertheless, it is
highlighted that the severity or impact of certain causes are likely to differ per
individual, for instance due to the influence of training and experience.
Research carried out by one of the authors into the emergency services, suggests that
crises as phenomena are frequently misunderstood within simulated training contexts
(Borodzicz, 1997, 1999).  It is argued that crisis events should be distinguished from
emergencies and disasters as distinct from the perspective of response, requiring
different treatments for emergencies and disasters. A failure to understand this
distinction will result in exercises which are not realistic.  This issue is often confused
with realism in simulation contexts, or so called high fidelity exercises.
Some of the concerns about a reliance on overly structured and militaristic models in
game design are indicative of the misunderstanding and failure to model crisis
accurately by trainers.  The extent to which appropriate learning is taking place in this
context is also questionable and may be at a variance with contemporary theories of
corporate risk.  Many theorists now argue that in contrast it is qualitative skills, such
as flexibility, negotiating and the ability to effectively communicate which facilitate
crisis management.6
Learning
To investigate the usefulness of simulation exercises for crisis management training,
some understanding of the learning process seems crucial. The literature suggests, a
variety of different and sometimes contradictory models.  It is  argued, that an
overview to some of these could be useful as a logical introduction to an investigation
into the effectiveness of learning in a crisis context.
The Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘learn’, as “to get knowledge of (a subject) or
skill in (an art, etc.) by study, experience, or teaching (the authors believe that it is in
this final aspect, ‘teaching’ that most crisis simulations fail to utilise their full learning
potential).
Psychologists interested in  learning, have developed a number of sophisticated
models of the process.  One key model is Piaget’s theory of cognitive development
(Stern, 1997: 70; Gredler, 1992: 141). According to Piaget (1972), people develop
schemas, or ways of thinking.  When a person becomes exposed to a new perception,
or an experience which challenge existing schemas, a process of re-organisation and
adaptation occurs leading to new schemas.  This, Piaget refers to as ‘cognitive
growth’.  Learners, construct new cognitive structures through a process of
‘assimilation’.  Assimilation refers to the integration of new knowledge into existing
structures, and ‘accommodation’, which encompasses the adjustment of the existing
structure to integrate new information.  The result of this process is to place the
learner’s cognitive structure on to a higher level of thinking (Piaget, 1972).
A second key model is that of group dynamics developed by Lewin (1936).  Lewin
argued that individual learning must be seen in the context of the ‘group’ for which
they form a part.  The group forms the grounding to a person’s individual perceptions.
This means that behaviour is a function of a person and his/her environment. It is
argued that people are likely to change behaviour if their experience is part of a social
or group process. According to Gredler (1992: 143), the Lewinian model addresses
behaviour in interpersonal situations, emphasising the examination and interpretation
of concrete experiences by the learner. It is further argued that the interpretation,
assisted by feedback to the learners, generates new concepts and hypotheses that feed
into further concrete experience (Gredler, 1992: 143).7
A third key model put forward here is that of Kolb. Kolb’s (1984) model of
experiential learning suggests an ongoing learning process ( Figure 1). Kolb (1984)
sees learning as a process whereby knowledge is created through the transformation
of experience and a reflective process. This is particularly interesting for simulation
training as it suggests that learning is an active if not inter-active process.
Figure 1 - Experiential Learning Model
(Kolb, 1984)
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However, Gillespie (1973, quoted in Petranek, 2000: 109), states that simulations are
not self-teaching and that good debriefing is required to reflect on purpose and
actions. From a simulation perspective, the model of experience-based learning is
particularly useful in two ways.  It enables students to acquire knowledge,
competence and skills, but also to craft their own mental model, to try it out and
observe and evaluate the results (Thompson and Dass, 2000: 29).
If we are to synthesise (albeit crudely), Piaget,  Lewin and Kolb’s approaches to
learning, then it would be important to understand the prior knowledge of learners,
their social and operational context and the degree to which they are able to reflect on8
previous experience and training to develop new mental models. Simulations then,
theoretically at least, should represent an ideal environment in which to facilitate such
learning. The authors would wish to argue that this theoretical stance might
oversimplify the reality of much of the crisis training conducted within a commercial
context.
Klabbers argues, that learning in an interactive learning environment not only takes
place as knowledge and skill acquisition, instead two competing frameworks exist,
which he refers to as the acquisition and participation or interaction metaphor
(Klabbers, 1999: 24). He goes on to argue that instead of the traditional view of
knowledge as abstract concepts or domains, it is gradually becoming augmented by a
view that knowledge is subjective and dependent on interaction.  Klabbers develops
Lewin’s model to suggest that ‘the learner is a person interested in participation in
certain kinds of activities, rather than in accumulating private possessions’.  Learning
can then be defined as the ‘improved participation in interactive systems’ ( Greeno,
1997, quoted in Klabbers, 1999: 25). Klabbers (1999: 26-27) argues that designers of
interactive learning environments have the option to balance the acquisition and
interaction metaphor, offering learners an opportunity to learn through practice,
discourse, communication, interaction and improved participation in interactive
systems.
It is often argued that learning in a crisis context occurs along three dimensions:
personal, interpersonal, and institutional (Serrie, 1992; O’Connel, 1997: 32; Lagadec,
1997: 27; Stern, 1997: 70).  Because of these different dimensions learning takes
place in different ways.  However, the basic learning unit in modern organisations has
increasingly become that of a group or team (Senge, 1990, quoted in Stern, 1997: 70).
Therefore, these models will be contrasted with concepts of learning that are of
particular significance to learning in a simulation context. This will contribute to
building an understanding of group or team oriented learning, and acts as the
foundation for further debate.
Tsuchiya and Tsuchiya (1999) define learning in a similar manner to Piaget. They
argue that learning generally occurs either when there is a match between ‘design for
action’ and the ‘intended outcome’, or when a mismatch between intentions and9
outcomes is identified and corrected to generate a match (Tsuchiya and Tsuchiya,
1999: 53).
Stern (1997: 70) expands the scope of learning to a group or organisational level and
argues that from an institutional perspective learning often focuses on the
development of roles, rules and routines through social experience. He states that
‘experience of particular social problems may reveal gaps in the technical
infrastructure or action repertoires of individuals and institutions’ (Stern, 1997: 70).
Conscious attempts, according to Stern (1997: 70), to fill these gaps by re-defining
rules and procedures to cope with future instances of the problem may be considered
attempts at experience-based learning.
Stern (1997) divides experience-based learning into explanation-based learning,
cognitive differentiation and integration and competence acquisition. According to
Hermann (1990: 11, quoted in Stern, 1997: 70), explanation-based learning results
from applying reason and reflection to direct, vicarious or virtual experience. Stern
(1997: 70) notes that explanation-based learning often uses counter-factual reasoning,
which is generally based on the premise that if a given factor had been different, the
course of events would have taken a different turn and negative consequence could
have been avoided. The concept of cognitive differentiation and integration, is similar
to Piaget’s concept of cognitive development, however is predominantly based on
(Etheridge 1981, Stern, 1997:71), the principle of increased intelligence and
sophistication of thought. Stern’s third category of experiential learning, competence
acquisition, is based on the observation of learning through changes, i.e. increase, in
the level of skills, which is similar to the concept of different cognitive levels
identified in Bloom’s taxonomy. In addition, it is identified that another kind of
competence can be developed through the mastery of rules. According to Onuf (1989;
quoted in Stern, 1997: 71), such mastery is derived from the combination of
knowledge of social rules and the development of judgement in their selective
application.
In their taxonomy on learning, Bloom et al. (1984: 7), divide learning into three
distinct domains: cognitive, affective and psychomotor. For the cognitive domain a
distinction is made between knowledge acquisition and the development of10
intellectual skills and abilities (Bloom, 1984: 7). In a crisis context, the definition
learning could be extended to encompass the acquisition of knowledge, skills, way of
thinking, or modes of social organisation (Etheridge, 1981;  Nicolini and  Meznar,
1995; in Stern 1997).
Planning Effective Simulation Exercises
‘Crises and disasters are complex events taking place within complicated
environments and resulting in diverse responses. To represent those conditions
adequately extensive preparation has to be undertaken to provide a training situation
in which learning, understanding and added competence can result’ (Rolfe, 1998: 14-
15). Simulations should aim at reproducing reality as closely as possible so  that
participants can experience elements of the crisis management process that they will
have to live through when a real crisis or disaster occurs. A distinction should be
made here between physical and psychological fidelity. The former is often perceived
to be more effective as a learning environment - this may even be true for emergency
exercises - but for crisis situations it is the latter which provides the best learning
environment.  Gredler argues (1992: 80-81), effective crisis management simulations
encourage participants to perceive the scenario as a threat, with time limitations for
effective data gathering. Simulations should produce the similar reactions and feelings
in participants as experienced in real life crisis events, e.g. tension, uncertainty, time
pressure, sense of inadequate information and frustration (Ibid., 1992: 82).
It is stressed that the characteristics of crises significantly differ from emergencies or
disasters. Hence, this difference should be translated into the simulation design, and
the simulated crisis should not be one perceived to be a low-threat, low-surprise event
that may be resolved over a period of time (Gredler, 1992: 81). However, Loveluck
(1994) notes that managers tend to require intricate and highly elaborate designs that
are often intended to demonstrate the complexity of either their managerial function
or their organisation. In practice, complex simulations are difficult to administer and
may even prove poor learning vehicles. It is therefore stressed that ‘simulations
should display an external simplicity which masks their internal complexity’
(Loveluck, 1994). He also argues, that in a business management context, trainers
may place too much emphasis on the need for realism, possibly at the expense of11
running a good simulation; therefore ‘verisimilitude should be valued more highly
than realism’(Loveluck 1994).
Gredler (1992: 59) states that simulations consist of four major components: assigned
roles; opening scene and/or background information; stimuli to which participants
respond; and reactions to participants’ actions. In a corporate setting the roles are
often pre-defined and laid down in a contingency or crisis management plan. The
background information and stimuli normally form the scenario of the simulation
exercise. The amount of information and schedule of delivery should be documented
in an ‘incident list’. ’t Hart (1997, 209-210) categorises incidents and argues that the
content, form and sequence of the information are carefully programmed to enhance
the crisis atmosphere, introduce specific occasions for decision and induce particular
forms of individual and collective behaviour.
Evaluating and Validating Simulation Exercises
The results of crisis simulation exercise can be diverse. Nevertheless, it should reflect
the establishment of the training objectives. The effects of simulations are that they
impinge directly on the individuals responding to the simulated crisis and can be seen
to ‘affect the mindset of participants who execute the tasks for which they have been
trained in keeping with the response plan’ (Peterson and Perry, 1999: 242). They can
serve as opportunities to ‘validate’ arrangements for planning, training and provide
the forum to test the effectiveness of the training programme, the plan as well as the
ability of personnel to execute the plan. (Peterson and Perry, 1999: 242).
Gredler (1992: 141) states that to be maximally effective, the experience of the
participants should result in both reflection on the experience and to new patterns of
thought; hence ‘such learning cannot be left to chance or to a brief post-exercise
discussion’ (Gredler, 1992: 141). Instead post simulation activities should be planned
as carefully and thoughtfully as the simulation itself (Ibid., 1992: 141). Knippenburg-
Gillis (1996: 117) points out that considering ‘what’ and ‘how’ to evaluate begins
during the design and development phases.
According to Flin (1996: 79) it is generally accepted that feedback is essential for
increasing self-awareness and improving leadership. However, the purpose of12
debriefings is not restricted to giving feedback on players’ performance, it also
encompasses improvements to the exercise process itself (Knippenburg-Gillis, 1996:
117; Home Office, 1998: 11), if this were to also inform organisational processes then
organisational learning may be taking place. This is congruent with Petranek (2000:
109), who highlights another important feature of  the debrief, adding value to the
simulation activity by grounding it in purpose and theory.
In a corporate setting, hence for crisis management teams,  Flin’s (1996: 79)
observation that for incident commanders and command structures feedback should
be critical but constructive and designed to identify strengths as well as training
needs, may be of equal importance. However, Salas et al. (1995: 98) caution that
feedback for team tasks is not entirely straightforward. They argue that an unintended
consequence of giving team feedback without respect to the relationship between
individual and team performance is that incorrect behaviours may be reinforced. This,
as is argued, could even diminish improvement and may wash out the impact of
feedback on both individuals and team (Salas et al., 1995: 98; quoted in Flin, 1996:
80).
Thiagarajan (1994), argues that people don’t learn from actual experiences, instead
they learn from reflecting on the experience. Debriefing helps participants to reflect
on their simulation experience and to learn transferable skills and concepts
(Thiagarajan, 1993: 47). Thiagarajan (1993: 47) points out that a range of methods
can be used amongst which are: guided, mediated, and video supported debriefing,
debrief games, journal writing, questionnaires, panel discussions, dialogues, etc. It is
argued that a structured form of debriefing, using a standard set of questions appears
more effective, even if given weekly (Thiagarajan, 1993: 47; Di  Battista, 1986: 28-
32).
Petranek (2000: 109) argues that participants should not only be engaged in the initial,
oral debrief, but should conduct a written debrief somewhat later. This would allow
for some private time to examine behaviours, emotions, feelings and statements made
by themselves and others; in other words to make sense of it all (Ibid., 2000: 110).
Furthermore, since participants learn by doing written debriefing would form the next
step in the learning process because people are again learning by doing; moreover in13
oral debriefing there is often so little time (Ibid., 2000: 110). However, Hofstede and
Petersen (1999: 438) caution that available time should not be cut, but ‘when faced
with time constraints it is better to simplify the game than to shorten the evaluation’.
So far, the focus of debriefing has been on the exercise participants reflecting on their
experience, either as a self-induced activity or facilitated by trainers. However, in a
crisis management setting a variety of internal and/or external experts may be
involved in monitoring and evaluating the exercise (Knippenburg-Gillis, 1996: 117-
122).  Paton (1999: 131) states that the evaluation has to be sufficiently objective and
capable of contributing to the continual development of the organisational capability.
To ensure this, as is argued, ‘critical and comprehensive reviews are essential and
should be conducted in an environment characterised by organisational ownership of
the problem and in a no-blame atmosphere’ (Paton, 1999: 131). Moreover, to do
otherwise may complicate staff and business recovery and lessen commitment to the
business continuity process (Ibid., 1999: 131).
Simulations tend to be resource intensive to produce and it would therefore be
pragmatic to consider the effectiveness of simulator devices for achieving their
purpose or aim (Borodzicz and  Pidgeon, 1996). However, measuring this
effectiveness may be difficult because the real purpose of many simulations is not
easy to identify - for neither players nor designers - or because it changed during the
planning process, or the simulation may have multiple purposes (Borodzicz, 1997: 68-
69). Furthermore, validation may prove particularly problematic because the
subjective and dynamic nature of crisis response makes it hard to measure in a
scientific way (Ibid. 68-69).
In a corporate setting, a cost-benefit analysis might provide a useful method of
validation (Borodzicz (1997: 284). However, because of the number of variables
involved in business continuity or crisis management, such an analysis would be
simply too crude, requiring validation at a more qualitative level, and, for instance
debriefing can be fundamentally important in validation (Borodzicz, 1999: 177).
Gredler (1992: 86-87, 156-157) argues that evaluation should firstly look at the crisis
situation, secondly review the decision-making roles and thirdly evaluate the exercise
dynamics. She further distinguishes between team and large group simulations, but14
the evaluation of all post-simulation activities are in essence conducted along similar
lines; i.e. analysing the group post-simulation discussion and reviewing follow-up
activities. Although in Gredler’s model the simulated “crisis reality” seems to play a
dominant part, caution may be appropriate, since it can be argued that with a high
degree of realism in the simulation the realistic crisis characteristics may impede
training.
Staw et al. (1981: 502, 1997: 77) suggest that the introduction of a heightened threat
perception into the decision-making process is likely to produce restriction in
information processing and constriction of control, with power more concentrated in
higher levels of hierarchy. In contrast to  Lagadec’s (1993) observation that crises
require creative and flexible responses, these two effects lead to a tendency towards
rigidity in response, which is characterised by reliance on a well-learned or dominant
mode of thought or action. Stern (1997: 76-81) highlights that the characteristics of
crises result in a learning dichotomy; they may offer opportunities to learn, but may
also restrict learning. It can therefore be argued that it is uncertain how realistic the
simulated crisis should be.
A second critique needs to be made with regard to Gredler’s apparent neglect of the
intricacies of team performance assessment.  Belbin (1981, 1993) suggests that
alterations in team composition can seriously change performance. For analysis of
high performance teams, i.e. teams responsible for crisis management, Flin (1996:
193-194) refers to a list of characteristics and requirements composed by Salas and
Canon-Bowers (1993) (Table 1). A distinction is made between basic and advanced
teams, which seems related to a level of prior knowledge and experience. In later
work Cannon-Bowers  et al (1995) confirm these observations, but also add co-
ordination and decision-making as distinctive dimensions (Table 1). Klein (1995) has
developed a training technique and assessment scheme for advanced team decision-
making based on an assessment of team resources, team identity, team-self
management and team thinking.
Basic team characteristics:
Individual task proficiency15
Clear concise communication
Collective orientation
Shared goal and mission
Advanced team requirements for enhanced performance:
Shared understanding of the task
Shared understanding of other members’ responsibilities
Team leadership
Collective efficacy (sense of ‘teamness’)
Anticipation
Flexibility
Efficient implicit communication (aware of each other’s
needs)
Monitor own performance
Key dimensions:
Adaptability
Shared situational awareness
Performance monitoring and feedback
Leadership/team management
Interpersonal relations
co-ordination
communication
decision-making
Salas and Cannon-Bowers (1993); Cannon-Bowers et al. (1995)
Table 1 – Characteristics, Requirements and Key Dimensions
Some Additional Aspects and Considerations
Theories of crisis management are lacking while at the same time the field of study is
complicated. This often results in simulations enabling facilitators and designers to
learn more from the exercise than the intended participants. Hermann (1997: 243)
points out simulation designers are also learners and are like participant observers
who ‘both monitor what is going on to enhance the experience for participants and
observe the process for new theoretical insight’. This phenomenon can, albeit in part,16
be explained with Bloom’s taxonomy of learning. Arguably, knowledge is acquired at
different levels because the base knowledge of participants differs from that of
observers. Following Bloom (1984) if objectives aim at enabling participants to
acquire knowledge and abilities at the application level, observers, in contrast, may
already possess the ability to apply. Hence their learning would take place at higher
cognitive levels, i.e. analysis, synthesis and evaluation. It is noted that, because both
parties have encountered dissimilar learning experiences, this phenomenon, if not
anticipated, may introduce difficulties for the evaluation process.
Gosen and Washbush (1999: 292-303) argue that differences in styles of teaching
affect the performance of students during simulations. Because there is no clear
relationship between performance and learning, it is not a good indicator of learning.
A number of factors may influence the outcome of a simulation, which may also
influence the learning experience. Such factors have been summarised in a list of
independent variables and include: instructor behaviours in introducing the
simulation; previous experience; the instructor’s role; and the debriefing of the
simulation experience (Gosen and Washbush, 1999: 299).
Despite the advantages of simulations and the opportunities that they may provide,
they should only be offered as a training methodology when people are ready for
them. Lagadec (1993: 331) argues that undertaking them too soon could seriously
heighten anxiety levels and reinforce defence mechanisms, while undertaking them
too late might merely set in-house attitudes in concrete, leaving no room for
manoeuvre to adjust to other partners.
It has been argued earlier in the paper that simulation exercises need to display a
degree of realism to prepare people appropriately. However, for a variety of reasons –
for example, learning objectives or ethical considerations, the presence of
organisational constraints may obstruct a realistic emulation. Paton (1999: 131) warns
that participants may not be aware of such limitations, leaving them with an incorrect
perception of the organisations’ response capability. For instance, business continuity
plans are mostly designed around worst-case scenarios. However, organisations often
encounter events that do not constitute a major test and faced with such events, the
psychological mechanisms that guide perceptions of performance tend to overestimate17
future response capability and underestimate future risk status ( Paton and Smith,
1998). According to Rosenthal et al. (1989: 417) the alleged realism of the exercises
may also be a danger for the subjects may leave a series of exercises thinking they
know what is going to happen when a real crisis occurs. It is suggested that to prevent
that exercises become a source for ill-guided analogies, they should be presented in a
contingent and sensible manner, while explicitly acknowledging their limitations
(Ibid., 1989: 417).
Relating simulation exercises to the theoretical concepts of learning it can be
concluded that they offer opportunities for experiential learning in a team setting.
Simulation exercises provide an interactive environment in which participants are
enabled to learn through practice, discourse, communication, and social interaction.
An increase of skills and competencies can be achieved through the mastery of rules
and their selective application. However, the specific nature of crises not only require
rules and procedures to be applied flexibly and creatively, but they often need to be
adjusted or new ones need inventing, which offers opportunities for learning at higher
cognitive levels.
The effects of the crisis situation, and hence the degree of reality of the scenario, were
assumed to be indicators of learning. It has been argued that crises are different
phenomena and distinguish themselves from emergencies and disasters in that they
require a different approach. For the validation of exercises, Gredler (1992) uses this
distinction and argues that the emotions of crises should be recreated as part of the
learning environment. It is argued that if this crisis realism is translated into the
exercise design with precision and accuracy, it may consequently introduce some
other features of crises that could also impede learning (Stern, 1997). In other words
the realistic crisis simulation may not support learning. The authors’ research in to the
UK Bank’s experiences showed that during exercises realistic crisis features were
evident in the reaction and responses of the participants, but often these were not
induced by the scenario. Consequently, at times individuals ceased to learn because
they felt overwhelmed and became paralysed.
Analysis was conducted assuming that learning should be measurable from improved
individual and team performance. Theories of team decision-making and analysis of18
team performance tend to suggest that many variables determine the effectiveness of
team decision-making. Analysis of the simulated performance of two of the Bank’s
crisis management teams exposed difficulties in identifying specific crisis
management features.  Many aspects of crisis management are intrinsically linked.
Improvements to any one aspect may not necessarily improve the overall result.
Instead changes in the organisational structure and procedures introduced new
problems and challenges for learning. These findings tend to confirm  Gosen and
Washbush’s (1999) observations that performance is not a good indicator for learning.
However, the list of independent variables composed by Gosen and Washbush did not
offer a useful methodology to assess the usefulness of the simulation exercises.
Furthermore, it has been stated that reflection is important for individual and team
learning, yet in the Bank’s case seemed to be averted during exercise debriefings.
Although it was found that organisational learning had taken place, organisational,
social and political factors are suspected of potentially having deteriorated the
opportunity for learning. Nevertheless, it was found that the exercises offered
opportunities to those responsible for planning business continuity and crisis
management to refine the crisis management structure and procedural arrangements.
This tends to confirm the theory that those facilitating and observing simulation
exercises may learn more from the experience than those who participate. In the
situation of the Bank it has supported organisational learning and may have resulted
in the Bank becoming more able to respond, while in turn this may also have
enhanced the individuals’ perceptions of the Bank’s abilities (Peterson and Perry,
1992: 242).
Conclusion
Assessing the usefulness of crisis simulation exercises and their potential for learning
remains a complex issue. Our research has demonstrated that many different variables
influence the outcome of a training experience. Arguably, a better indication of the
value of simulation effectiveness as a learning tool could be obtained if these
variables were more easily controlled. The researchers have been involved in the
development and implementation of alternative approaches to training. These
alternatives are based on the principle that observers may learn more - or at least
differently - than participants. Preliminary results show steep learning curves when19
trainees are offered the opportunity to participate as both player and facilitator. The
use of video enables trainees acting as facilitators to simultaneously observe and
reflect on other players’ performances, providing them with opportunities to learn at
higher cognitive levels. Involving participants in the design and evaluation of
simulation exercises would add yet another dimension to both individual and group
learning. Through experimentation these factors could be better controlled and varied
to assess the extent of the affects on the learning outcome.
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